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Merger externalities in oligopolistic markets
Klaus Gugler and Florian Szu¨cs∗
May 9, 2016
Abstract
We evaluate the external effects of 183 large mergers at the market level by assessing
the impact on the main competitors of the merging firms. Using synthetic control groups
and difference in difference estimation, we find that the return on assets of rival firms
increases significantly after a merger. The size of the effect varies strongly with market
characteristics and the intensity of competition. (JEL L13, L40, G34)
1 Introduction
In models of oligopolistic competition, a large horizontal merger imposes two externalities
on the market: a positive externality due to the reduction of the number of competitors (the
market power effect) and a negative externality due to the optimal reallocation of the merging
firms’ productive assets (the efficiency effect). Thus, not only the merging firms, but also
the non-merging rivals are affected. The net externality on the market depends on the relative
strength of these two antipodal forces, but should, under fairly general conditions, be positive:
with quantity competition or price competition with differentiated goods, the merged entity
finds it - absent substantial efficiency gains - optimal to reduce its production (Farrell and
Shapiro, 1990; Deneckere and Davidson, 1985). In the new equilibrium the rivals sell a higher
quantity at a higher price, which is clearly profitable.
A sizeable number of empirical studies evaluate the impact of mergers on market prices
(section 2.2 reviews the literature) and most find some evidence for higher post-merger prices,
which are indicative of increased market power. Thus the link between mergers and market
externalities described in the paragraph above has been empirically corroborated in a number
of merger case studies and a number of industries. However, the conclusions of these articles
do not extend beyond the particular market under investigation and their methodologies
∗Gugler: Vienna University of Economics and Business, Welthandelsplatz 1, 1020 Vienna, Austria. E-mail:
klaus.gugler@wu.ac.at; Szu¨cs: Vienna University of Economics and Business, Welthandelsplatz 1, 1020 Vienna,
Austria. E-mail: florian.szuecs@wu.ac.at. The authors would like to thank Tomaso Duso, Robert Feinberg and the
participants of RNIC 2012 (Vienna) and IIOC 2013 (Boston) for helpful comments.
1
exhibit significant differences. The contribution this article aims to make is to establish a
link between merger externalities and rival firms for a large number of merger cases and
industries, using a unified evaluation framework.
Extending the analysis of merger externalities to many cases entails a number of concep-
tual and practical issues. In case studies of particular mergers, detailed data on the relevant
markets, market conditions, rival firms as well as pre- and post-merger data on prices are usu-
ally available. Reliable data on these indicators are indispensable to an accurate assessment of
merger effects, but collecting them for a sizeable sample of mergers is practically impossible.
We tackle this problem by relying on data collected by the European Commission (EC)
in the course of market investigations conducted during merger reviews. The EC routinely
publishes a competitive assessment and a delineation of the relevant markets in its decisions
on notified mergers. The publicly available decision documents of the reviews include the
identities of the main competitors, the geographic extent of the markets and various structural
market characteristics we employ in the analysis. The list of the most important competitors
in the product markets concerned by the merger provides us with a set of firms that are most
likely affected by the merger’s externality. We link these firms to accounting data such that
we can compare their return on assets in the periods before and after the merger.
Thus the data from the merger reviews on the one hand solves the problem of identifying
the firms which were affected by the change in market structure due to a merger. On the other
hand, it also helps us to find a set of firms that were not affected and are therefore eligible
to function as a control group. To this end, we exploit the fact that the EC also assesses the
extent of the relevant geographic market concerned by the merger. We use this information to
construct a valid counterfactual by selecting control observations from outside the mergers’
geographic scope.1
The use of correctly identified merger rivals and uncontaminated control groups permits
us to provide causal estimates of the size of merger externalities in a cross-industry study. Our
findings are compatible with the predictions of Cournot and differentiated-goods Bertrand
competition: Competitors experience an average increase of around 0.7 percentage points in
their profit-to-assets ratio, which is substantial given an average, pre-merger profit to asset
ratio of almost 4%.
This strongly suggests that market power effects significantly outweigh efficiency effects
for the mergers in the sample. We further decompose this average effect via the most impor-
tant aspects of the competitive environment the merger takes place in. In particular, we find
that mergers leading to very large market shares in some product markets, mergers in markets
with a low elasticity of demand, mergers that primarily affect national markets, mergers with
1Previous studies on the effect of mergers on rivals’ prices were able to delineate the relevant market by focusing
on industries characterized by many different local markets - e.g. hospitals (Dafny, 2009) or banks (Prager and
Hannan, 1998) - such that some non-merging firms were merger rivals and some were not. This approach is not
feasible in a cross-industry study.
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a high market share of the target, and a low number of competitors lead to a large positive
profit externality on rivals. Moreover, by looking at the time dynamics, we find that most of
the effects materialize fairly soon, mostly already in the first year after consummation of the
merger. This is another indication that the observed effects are due to a preponderance of
market power over efficiency effects, which would take more time to manifest.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: section 2 discusses the theoretical
frame and related empirical literature, section 3 is concerned with the creation of the dataset,
a number of methodological issues in the estimation of causal effects and the empirical ap-
proach. Results are presented in section 4 and section 5 concludes.
2 Literature
2.1 Theoretical frame
Theory posits that the impact of a merger on the equilibrium in an oligopoly is the balance
of the anti-competitive market power effect (Stigler, 1950) and the pro-competitive efficiency
effect (Williamson, 1968). Mergers that do not entail any effects other than reducing the
number of competitors will generally raise prices (Perry and Porter, 1985; Deneckere and
Davidson, 1985). For the Cournot model, Farrell and Shapiro (1990) show that there exists a
critical level of efficiency gains - modelled via a reduction of marginal cost - such that the pre-
merger equilibrium is restored. Werden (1996) and Froeb and Werden (1998) derive similar
conditions for a merger to be consumer welfare enhancing under the assumptions of Bertrand
competition with differentiated goods and Cournot competition respectively. These conditions
are more likely to be violated in the Bertrand case if pre-merger markups and diversion ratios
(i.e. the share of demand for one product, that will be recaptured by the other after a price
increase) are high and in the Cournot case if market shares are high and the elasticity of
demand is low.
The intuition for these results is that if pre-merger markups are high, the elasticity of
demand must be low, indicating low substitution possibilities. Conversely, price reductions
following mergers are more likely in markets with higher elasticity of demand, because a
given price reduction will lead to a larger gain in market shares. Therefore prices are likely
to increase after a merger - benefiting rivals - if a market is highly concentrated and if there
is little possibility for substitution. In the empirical part, we try to capture these predictions
from stylized models as well as widen the analysis to other plausible predictions.
First, we look at the increase in market share of the combined firm due to the merger,
that is at the size of the market share of the target firm.2 We hypothesize that the larger this
share, the larger will be unilateral effects due to the merger because the diversion ratio will
2One could also interpret this share as a measure for the intensity of treatment due to the merger. See e.g.
Angrist and Imbens (1995) for an econometric analysis of treatment intensity.
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be higher, and the more we expect prices and therefore rival profits to increase post merger.
Second, as shown by e.g. Brouwer (2008) a merger of two relatively efficient firms, i.e.
with large market shares, raises price more than a merger between two relatively inefficient
firms. This implies that the effect of concentration on prices should dependent on the level of
concentration resulting from the merger. Thus, we calculate the maximum combined market
share post merger across all affected product markets. We hypothesize that these maximum
market shares across product markets have price and therefore rival profit increasing effects,
since monopolization or severe dominance in some product markets preclude effective com-
petition in these segments leading to larger unilateral effects. An example might help the
intuition. Compare two mergers, 1 and 2, each giving rise to an average combined market
share of 50 percent across two product markets, A and B. Merger 1 results in 50 percent mar-
ket share in both product markets, merger 2 results in a market share of 10 percent in product
market A and 90 percent in product market B. Using only average market shares would lead
us to expect equal effects of the mergers on rival profits but masks the near monopolization of
product market B in merger 2. We explicitly account for this by using the maximum combined
market share across product markets to measure (near) monopolization of some segments and
the ensuing larger unilateral effects. We expect that the larger this share, the more rival profits
go up post merger.
Third, the elasticity of demand affects merger effect predictions in essentially all oligopoly
models, with larger price increasing effects to be expected if the demand elasticity is lower.
Because we do not directly observe the elasticities of demand in our sample, we use the pre-
merger profitability of acquirers as a proxy. High profitability is very likely to be the result of
a low firm specific elasticity of demand that the firms face.3 We expect that the larger initial
profits, the more rival profits go up post merger.
Fourth, we look at the share of affected product markets that are national in scope. As
mentioned, the EU Commission very carefully defines product and geographic markets before
investigating the merger, with the standard test being the ’SSNIP’ (small but significant non-
transitory increase in price)-test. This test essentially defines relevant markets according to
likely substitution away from the product after a price increase, with little substitution leading
to narrow, e.g. national, markets. We therefore expect that a larger share of national product
markets leads to a higher externality on rival profits, since substitution possibilities are more
limited.
Finally, we look at the number of competitors identified by the EC (i.e. including firms
we do not have data on) and remaining after the merger. Clearly, we expect a larger positive
externality on rivals if their number is small, since remaining competition intensity is lower.4
3An alternative interpretation of large profits would be superior efficiency of the firm, however these efficiency
rents should be competed away over time.
4Of course, an additional reason why market power may increase after a merger in an oligopoly with few firms
is that pro-collusive behaviour may be facilitated.
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Table 1 sums up the hypothesized effects of the merger and market characteristics dis-
cussed above.
Table 1: Expected effects on externality
Variable Expected sign Reason
Target share > 0 higher treatment intensity
Highest share > 0 near monopolization
Initial profits > 0 small elasticity of demand
National markets > 0 few possibilities for substitution
Competitor count < 0 remaining competition
2.2 Related empirical studies
There are a number of studies that use matching to create a credible counterfactual and differ-
ence in difference estimation to establish causality in the evaluation of mergers: for example,
Ornaghi (2009) and Szu¨cs (2014) find that firms decrease their R&D activities after mergers.
Egger and Hahn (2010) find that the consolidation of the Austrian banking sector led to sig-
nificantly improved cost performance. These studies employ propensity score matching to
pair merging firms with non-merging control firms. In the present study we use a more flex-
ible synthetic control group approach (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003), which is discussed in
greater detail in section 3.3.
While there is a large literature analyzing the direct effects of mergers on the insiders (e.g.
Banerjee and Eckard (1998); Gugler et al. (2003); Mueller (1997) provides an overview), there
are few studies that attempt to capture the impact on rivals. These studies either focus on the
effect of the merger on market prices or the stock market performance of rivals.
The latter group was pioneered by two studies: Eckbo (1983) and Stillman (1983) look at
the stock returns of rivals in horizontal mergers and find no evidence for anti-competitive
effects. More recent studies use the reaction of rivals’ stocks to distinguish pro- and anti-
competitive mergers and evaluate the optimality of merger control decisions (Duso et al.,
2007, 2013). They find that rivals accrue significant positive abnormal returns in response to
a merger announcement (Clougherty and Duso, 2009), which is consistent with an increase in
market power.
The effect of mergers on market prices is studied in the banking industry (Prager and
Hannan, 1998; Focarelli and Panetta, 2003), the airline industry (Kim and Singal, 1993), the
health care industry (Dafny, 2009), gasoline stations (Hastings, 2004; Houde, 2012), parking
markets (Chone´ and Linnemer, 2012), and various consumer product industries (Ashenfelter
and Hosken, 2010). Using different methodological approaches, all these studies find some
evidence for price increases after mergers in the industry. This points to a preponderance of
market power effects over efficiency effects to the benefit of rivals. See also Weinberg (2008) for
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a survey of nine studies on the price effects of horizontal mergers finding that most mergers
examined resulted in price increases of both merging and rival firms.
It can, however, be argued that both strands of literature suffer from various shortcomings.
Studies based on stock market data can only assess the markets’ expectations about the effects
on rivals, which do not need to be accurate, and they also strongly rely on the assumption that
markets are informationally efficient. Critical perspectives on event-studies are provided by
McAfee and Williams (1988) and Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005). The studies on price effects
- while innovative in their way of identifying causal effects (e.g. recently Houde (2012) and
Chone´ and Linnemer (2012)) - are restricted to specific mergers or specific markets.
This study aims to fill some of the gaps by (i) assessing the net externality of mergers on
rivals based on reliable, ex-post measures in (ii) a large sample containing mergers in many
different industries, using (iii) carefully constructed control groups in the estimation of causal
effects. Our aim is thus to provide a broader picture on merger effects in oligopolies and to
draw conclusions for competition policy.
3 Data & methodology
In this section we describe how the dataset on competitors was created and discuss our ap-
proach to measuring the external effects of mergers.
3.1 Constructing the dataset
To construct the dataset, we combine information on mergers that underwent the scrutiny of
European competition law5 between 1990 and 2007 with firm-level information on the firms
involved in these mergers.
From a total of 183 merger decisions,6 we record the names of 573 rival firms identified
by the EC. These rivals are the main competitors of the merging firms in the product markets
affected by the merger. Roughly 60% of the mergers in the sample were approved subject
to conditions and obligations, while the remainder was cleared unconditionally. Almost a
third of the cases went to an in-depth phase 2 investigation. The mergers resulted in a mean
(averaged across product markets), post-merger market share of merging firms of around
39%. We also collect information on the area of economic activity affected by the merger (the
NACE code(s)). In all mergers in the sample the affected product markets were found to be
either national or EU-wide in scope; since world-wide product markets would contradict the
identification strategy proposed below, we leave them out of the analysis. Almost two thirds
5The EC investigates mergers with a ’community dimension’, defined as a set of financial thresholds. Details
can be looked up at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/legislation.html.
6Merger-level data was gathered from the official decisions of the European Commission, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/.
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of the individual product markets were found to be national in scope while the remainder of
markets were EU-wide.
We merge the rival firms to balance-sheet data from the Thomson Reuters Worldscope
database, providing yearly accounting data on income, assets, debt and market capitalization.
Profitability is calculated as net income divided by total assets, Tobin’s q is the sum of market
capitalization and total debt divided by total assets. All monetary variables are CPI-adjusted
to 2005 USD and converted to logs.
We also merge the rival firms to the SDC Platinum database, which contains data on all
mergers worldwide with a transaction value of at least 1 million USD. We use this information
in sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 in order to control for subsequent mergers among rivals, which could
potentially confound our findings.
3.2 Identification
To identify the effect of a merger on the rivals in the relevant market, we need to define a
counterfactual, i.e. we need to make an assumption on what would have happened in absence
of the merger. With that achieved, we can then estimate the causal effect using difference in
difference methods. Previous studies trying to estimate the effect of mergers on the affected
firms have usually opted for firm-level matching (e.g. Ornaghi (2009); Egger and Hahn (2010))
or IV approaches (e.g. Dafny (2009); Houde (2012)) to control for selection into the treatment
group. When evaluating the effect of mergers on merging firms, this is appropriate. However,
when evaluating the effects on merger rivals this approach does not seem entirely appropriate:
firms do not self-select into being merger rivals. Moreover it seems more fitting to define
treatment at the market level instead of the firm level, that is, to compare the group of merger
rivals with a suitable control group of unaffected firms. This is the case because the externality
of a merger affecting a market is not a treatment of the individual rival firm, but affects all
rivals as a group.
For each merger the sample contains data on between 1 and 12 rival firms (3.13 on aver-
age). These firms are directly exposed to the external effect of the merger and are assigned to
the treatment market. To generate control markets we proceed as follows: first, we identify
the 4-digit NACE sectors that were affected by the merger (as per the EC’s product market
assessment) and only consider firms in these industries in the construction of control markets.
Thus, only markets with the same economic activity are considered as potential control group.
Next we identify national markets that were not affected by the merger as per the EC’s geo-
graphic market assessment: if the geographic market was found to be national in scope, we
exclude the affected nation from the pool of potential controls; if the market was found to be
EU-wide, we exclude all European nations from the pool of potential controls.7 In addition,
7Sometimes the EC provides different market sizes or is undecided between two market definitions, because
market extent is not material for the decision. In these cases, the largest market definition was retained to ensure
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we also exclude the nations of origin of the rival firms from the pool to make sure that control
groups are unaffected by second-order effects. This geographic approach to identifying the
external effect of mergers on rivals entails that mergers with world-wide relevant markets
cannot be evaluated, since no national markets can reliably be assumed to be unaffected. For
this reason, the sample only contains mergers where markets are either national or EU-wide.8
Thus the set of potential control markets for a merger is the cross product of the industry9
affected by the merger and the set of all countries that were not affected by the merger.
For these unaffected markets and for the market of merger rivals, we calculate the weighted
average return on assets (firm profitability weighted by firm assets), which is the basis for
finding suitable control markets.10
3.3 Synthetic control markets
To generate the counterfactual, we do not employ a traditional control group approach (i.e.
every treated observation is assigned one non-treated observation), but instead use the con-
cept of synthetic control groups (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2010).11 The
intuition behind this approach is that - instead of a singular control observation - an algorithm
selects a weighted basket of control observations, such that the pre-treatment dynamics of the
treated observation are best approximated by the dynamics of this synthetic control unit. This
approach has the advantage, that the characteristics of the treated unit can be approximated
by an arbitrary linear combination of all available controls, which allows for a better fit than
a single control unit. Furthermore, even if only few potential controls are available, there
usually exists a weighted average that will reasonably well approximate the treated unit.
We start out by aggregating all rivals in a given merger to form the treated market, weigh-
ing the individual firms by their total assets. The synthetic control market is created by finding
all eligible control markets according to the criteria described above (same economic activity
but outside the merger’s geographic scope) and exclude those, where the available data are
insufficient.12 On average, there are 15.77 potential control markets for every group of rival
firms.
The algorithm then finds the weighted linear combination of these markets, which min-
imizes the difference in profitability (the outcome variable) to the treated market over the
that controls are chosen from an unaffected area.
8In around 20% of mergers scrutinized by the EC, the geographic markets are found to be world-wide.
9If a merger affects more than one industry, we pool the firms in all industries concerned.
10We additionally calculate the dispersion of firm profits, the mean value of Tobin’s q and the Herfindahl-
Hirschmann index, which are used to extend the set of matching covariates in a robustness check presented in
section 4.1.1.
11In a previous version of this article, we utilized a 1:1 propensity score matching algorithm to match merger
rivals with control firms and obtained qualitatively similar results.
12We require pre-treatment data on the outcome variable for matching and post-treatment data on the outcome
for evaluation.
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entire pre-merger period. Thus, a basket of related (same economic activity) but unaffected
(outside the mergers‘ geographic scope) markets is selected, such that the profitability of the
merger rivals is best approximated in the periods t − 3, t − 2 and t − 1 leading up to the
merger. By matching on profits in these periods individually, not only the level of profits, but
also the pre-merger evolution of profits in the treated market is approximated.13 This is an
essential point in order for the common trends assumption - which is central to all estimation
of treatment effects involving matched control groups - to be plausibly fulfilled. On average,
the algorithm assigns positive weights to 9.24 markets, such that the average synthetic market
is constructed from more than 9 real markets.
More formally, let J be the number of available control markets in a given merger (J is
15.77 on average in the data) and W a J × 1 vector with nonnegative weights summing up to
one. Further, let X1 be a 3× 1 vector containing the average profitability of rivals in periods
t− 3, t− 2 and t− 1, and X0 a 3× J matrix containing the same information for the potential
control markets. The problem of constructing a synthetic control group is then solved by
calculating the optimal weighting matrix W∗, such that the difference in profitability in all
pre-merger periods between treated and control group, (X1 − X0 ×W)T(X1 − X0 ×W), is
minimized. The elements of W∗, denoted by (w∗1 , ...,w
∗
J ), are then the weights assigned to the
individual control markets and the synthetic control market is calculated as a weighted linear
combination.14
3.4 An example
In May 2005, Novartis AG, a Swiss medical company, notified the EC of its intent to acquire
Hexal AG, a German producer of generic medications. The Commission found that their
business activities overlap in 33 product markets (many of which related to the production
of immunosuppressants and antihistamines) in numerous member states. The Commission
identified a total of 34 different competitors and found that the parties’ average market share
after the merger would amount to 45% across all product markets, with an average increase
of 7% due to the merger. Since the transaction raised concerns in three national markets
(Denmark, Germany and Poland), the Commission required the companies to divest the rights
to produce and sell specific drugs in these countries. Subject to these conditions, the merger
was cleared.
We were able to link nine of the competitors identified by the EC to accounting data
13In a robustness check in section 4.1.1 we employ further matching covariates in an effort to futher improve the
accuracy of the matching procedure. Specifically, we match on the dispersion of profits, the average Tobin’s q of
firms and the HHI in addition to the outcome variable, profitability.
14This exposition neglects that in the case of multiple matching covariates - as used in the robustness check
in section 4.1.1 - , an additional weighing matrix for the covariates needs to be estimated. Abadie et al. (2010)
contains a more general description of the synthetic control algorithm.
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(Actavis, Teva, Schering-Plough and Beiersdorf, among others).15 These companies are head-
quartered in eight different countries.
The algorithm creating the synthetic control group commences by assigning the rival com-
panies to a fictional ’market’ and identifying all firms in the sample which are active in the
industry concerned by the merger (NACE C.21.20 - Manufacture of pharmaceutical prepa-
rations). We find 1192 firms, which are assigned to 43 different national markets. We then
calculate the mean profits (weighted by assets) for the national markets and the rival market,
resulting in a panel of 44 markets observed from 1989 to 2010. The next step is to identify
which of these markets are suitable for a control group. We exclude the nations of the merg-
ing parties (Switzerland and Germany) as well as those of the competitors (Finland, Germany,
Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Poland, Switzerland and the US) to ensure that the control group
is not directly or indirectly affected by the merger. Finally, we check the data availability on
the outcome (mean profitability) in the pre- and post-treatment periods and exclude markets
with missing data. This leaves us with 31 potential control markets.
Since the merger took place in 2005, the years 2002-2004 are the pre-merger period relevant
for matching. The next step is to approximate the evolution of profitability of the rivals (the
treatment market) with those of the control markets over the 2002-2004 period to the greatest
extent possible, using the profits of control markets in the 2002-2004 period. Through numer-
ical minimization of the squared prediction errors, all potential control markets are assigned
optimal weights to create a synthetic control market, that is, a fictional linear combination of
actual markets, that best approximates the treated market. In this specific example, all of the
31 markets receive positive weights, with the Indian, Italian, Slovenian and Belgian markets
being the main constituents.
The resulting control group tracks the evolution of rival profits very precisely in the pre-
merger period: the average absolute difference between the two groups amounts to .008 per-
centage points. In the evaluation period (2006-2010), the profits of the synthetic control market
remain similar to those in the matching period, while the rival profits increase significantly,
such that the average absolute difference between the groups rises to 2.57 percentage points.
3.5 Estimation
Once we have constructed the control markets, the estimation sample consists of a panel of
183 markets with mergers, observed in periods [−3,−1] before the transaction and [1, 5] after,
as well as 183 synthetic control markets observed over the same period of time. Thus the
maximum number of observations per unit in the panel is 8, while the average number of
observations is 7.41, due to data limitations.
15The discrepancy of competitors identified by the EC and competitors linked to firm-level data is owed to the
fact that the data contain only stock-market listed firms. In an unreported robustness check we assess whether
our findings depend on the number of firms matched and find that this is not the case, i.e. that results are robust
to constraining estimation to cases with few or many matched competitors.
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We then apply a DiD estimator to the dataset, such that the average treatment effect on the
treated (ATT) is estimated as the difference between both the before and after periods and the
treatment and control group. Formally, we estimate
Πm,t = α+ treatedm + postt + (treatedm × postt) + εm,t (+treatedm × postt × ξm,t), (1)
where Πm,t designates the average profits of firms in market m at time t, treatedm indicates
the treatment group (the market of merger rivals) and postt indicates the evaluation period,
t > 0. In the regressions, treatedm should ideally be small and insignificant, as this would
indicate that the synthetic control group approach succeeds in levelling systematic differences
between treated and non-treated units. postt measures any systematic post-merger trend in
profitability, that is common to treated and non-treated markets.
The interaction treatedm × postt is the average treatment effect on the treated, while εm,t is
an error term. The term in brackets, (treatedm×postt× ξm,t), is an additional interaction of the
treat-post indicator with the variables of interest ξm,t, including the target’s average market
share, the combined firm’s maximum market share, the initial profits of the merging firms,
the share of markets which are national in scope and the number of identified competitors
(see section 2.1). Since we also include the ATT term (treated× post), the ξ-interactions can
be interpreted as deviations from the average effect.
The estimation of treatment effects over time is achieved in a very similar setting, by using
separate indicator variables for the specific post-periods. Thus, to measure period-specific
treatment effects we estimate
Πm,t = α+ treatedm +
5
∑
i=1
1t=i +
(
5
∑
i=1
1t=i × treatedm
)
+ εm,t. (2)
To evaluate the time dynamics of the interaction with merger and market characteristics,
we multiply the period-specific treatment indicators with the ξm,t’s. We again include the ATT
term (treatedm × postt), such that the ξm,t interactions can be interpreted as deviations from
the average effect:
Πm,t = α+ treatedm + (treatedm × postt) +
5
∑
i=1
1t=i +
(
5
∑
i=1
1t=i × treatedm × ξm,t
)
+ εm,t. (3)
Equations 2 and 3 analyze the time profile of treatment effects. We would expect market
power effects to materialize fairly soon, while achieving efficiency gains should take some
time. Note that equations 2 and 3 are identical, except for the last term in brackets in equation
3, i.e. the ξm,t interactions. This is because the period-specific treatment effects in equation 2,(
∑5i=1 1t=i × treatedm
)
, sum up to the (treatedm × postt) term in equation 3.
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3.6 Summary Statistics
The evolution of profits of treatment and control markets is illustrated in figure 1. During
the matching period (three years before the merger up to one year before the merger), the
average absolute difference of the profitabilities of treated and control markets is less than
0.03 percentage points. This difference is insignificant on average as well as in the individual
time periods. In the evaluation period (the five years after the merger), we see that this gap
has widened: while the profits in markets affected by mergers seem to be trending upwards
in most periods, those of the control markets have declined slightly.
Figure 1: Profitability of merger rivals and control groups
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To gain an intuition for whether the increased difference during the evaluation period is
due to arbitrary divergence or indicative of systematic merger externalities, we compare the
gap between treatment and control profitabilities observed in the data with gaps obtained
from placebo treatments. To this end, we randomly assign an average of 3.13 ’fake rivals’
(excluding the actual rivals) to each of the 183 merger cases (numbers were chosen to reflect
the actual sample). We then construct control groups and contrast the evolution of profits
between the two groups as described above. We repeat this process 150 times. If the gap
between treated and control markets observed in figure 1 is a random development, we would
expect many of the random gaps to be larger.
Figure 2 compares the gap obtained from the actual data with those from the placebo
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treatments. While almost all gaps lie in a narrow corridor of around ±.3 in the matching
period, their standard deviation more than triples in the evaluation period. For the actual
treatment, the gap increases from -.003 to more than 0.45 percentage points in the evaluation
period, which is the highest positive effect across all trials over the evaluation period. Thus,
the treatment effect on markets with actual mergers is like an upper envelope of the placebo
runs. This indicates that the increased gap between merger rivals and control markets appears
to reflect a causal effect due to merger externalities and is not an arbitrary trend.
Figure 2: Profitability difference in actual and placebo treatments
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Table 2 provides summary statistics and definitions of the variables employed in the anal-
ysis, table 3 provides correlation coefficients.
Table 3 shows that the correlations between the variables measuring merger and market
characteristics are of modest size and significance (p-values reported in parentheses). The two
highest correlations are found for average target and highest combined market share (which
correlate by construction) and highest share and national markets (which are also intuitively
correlated). With values of .51 and .32, these correlations do not give rise to econometric
concern. Interestingly and in line with expectations, the number of competitors (where a
higher value indicates more competition) correlates negatively with all other indicators (where
higher values indicate less competition).
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Table 2: Summary statistics and variable definitions
Outcome and matching variables
Mean SD Median Min Max Description
Profitability 4.27 3.02 4.05 -8.97 15.74 Net income divided by to-
tal assets, averaged over all
rivals using total assets as
weight
Profit dispersion 4.44 2.27 3.88 0.64 10.51 Standard deviation of firm
profits in a market
Tobins q 1.29 0.70 1.05 0.28 3.63 Market capitalization plus
total debt, divided by total
assets, averaged over all ri-
vals
HHI 0.35 0.15 0.32 0.08 0.78 Sum of squared market
shares (based on sales) in a
market
Merger and market characteristics
Mean SD Median Min Max Description
Target share 17.99 13.43 16.25 0 85 Mean market share of the
merger target across all af-
fected product markets
Highest share 64.63 27.08 64.40 2 100 Maximum combined market
share after the merger across
all affected product markets
Initial profits 5.54 6.84 4.21 -19.54 35.54 Profitability (calculated as
above) of the merging firms
in the year before the merger
National markets 0.65 0.40 0.86 0 1 Share of affected product
markets that are national in
scope
Competitor count 2.54 1.75 2.33 0 10 Average number of rival
firms identified by the EC
per product market
Notes: Data on outcome and matching variables are obtained from the Thomson Reuters Worldscope database;
data on merger and market characteristics were collected from the EC’s official decision documents.
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Table 3: Correlations
Variables Target share Highest share Initial Profits National markets
Highest share 0.51
(0.00)
Initial Profits 0.11 0.19
(0.23) (0.03)
National markets 0.14 0.32 0.18
(0.08) (0.00) (0.03)
Competitor count -0.14 -0.29 -0.16 -0.15
(0.07) (0.00) (0.06) (0.05)
4 Results
Table 4 presents the results on estimating equation 1. The first column simply displays the
average treatment effect on the treated (i.e. on rival markets), columns (2) to (6) add further
variables of interest (target share; highest share; initial profits; national markets; and competi-
tor count) in turn to look whether the average effect can be explained and disentangled by
these measures of competition intensity, with column (7) presenting a ’horse race’ of the im-
portance of these variables by including all of them. Generally, the equation is well specified
since the treated dummy is insignificant in all specifications, such that treated and non-treated
market profitabilities do not significantly differ in the matching period. The negative coeffi-
cients on the post-dummies are insignificant in all specifications.
Column (1) estimates a significant ATT of .702 percentage points on average over the five
years after the mergers. This constitutes an economically important effect if one considers that
the average profitability of rival firms before the mergers is almost 4 percentage points. Thus,
mergers on average entail a nearly 18 percent profitability increase for rival markets. In what
follows, we show that this average effect masks important differences in effects across mergers
depending on the variables measuring competition intensity.
Column (2) analyzes the question whether the average market share of the merger target -
which can be interpreted as a measure of treatment intensity - plays a role for the externality
on rivals. We indeed find that larger target market shares increase profits of rival markets
over-proportionally in the five years after the merger, consistent with unilateral effects being
larger. The ATT remains, however, significant at .601 percentage points indicating that other
factors are more important than target share.
Column (3) investigates whether it is extreme mergers, i.e. mergers that lead to very high
market shares in at least one product market as identified by the EC, that are responsible for
observed treatment effects. Indeed, the inclusion ’Highest share’ completely wipes out ATT
as measured by the dummy ’Treated*Post’. It appears that most of the measured average
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Table 4: Average treatment effects and interactions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treated 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068
(0.223) (0.222) (0.221) (0.218) (0.222) (0.223) (0.217)
Post -0.220 -0.219 -0.219 -0.219 -0.217 -0.220 -0.219
(0.204) (0.203) (0.202) (0.199) (0.203) (0.204) (0.198)
Treated * Post 0.702∗∗ 0.601∗ -0.313 0.300 -0.113 1.091∗∗∗ -1.012
(0.289) (0.341) (0.428) (0.308) (0.350) (0.346) (0.618)
Target share 0.021∗∗ -0.005
(0.010) (0.012)
Highest share 0.018∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗
(0.005) (0.007)
Initial Profits 0.154∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.024)
National markets 1.396∗∗∗ 0.668∗
(0.315) (0.391)
Competitor count -0.136∗ 0.097
(0.073) (0.101)
Constant 3.873∗∗∗ 3.871∗∗∗ 3.871∗∗∗ 3.870∗∗∗ 3.866∗∗∗ 3.871∗∗∗ 3.870∗∗∗
(0.158) (0.157) (0.157) (0.154) (0.157) (0.158) (0.153)
Observations 2712 2612 2644 2555 2692 2692 2482
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.04
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
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anti-competitive effects of mergers can be attributed to mergers that lead to very large market
shares in some product markets. For example, we estimate that the profit externality of merg-
ers on rival markets is around 1.8 percentage points for the 15 percent of mergers which lead
to at least one product market with 100 percent market share of the combined firm.16
Column (4) repeats the same exercise using the initial profits of the merging parties as a
proxy for the elasticity of demand. Again, the average treatment effect becomes insignificant
as most of the profit externality co-varies with initial profitability: the larger initial profits of
merging firms the larger the positive externality on rival markets. At the median value of
initial profits of 4.23 percent, rival markets enjoy an externality of .65 percentage points on
their profitability. Since the distribution of initial profits is skewed to the right, many markets
are affected more strongly: at the 75th percentile of the distribution initial profits are at 9.74
percent and the externality rises to 1.5 percentage points.
Column (5) uses the share of national markets affected by the merger as judged by the EC.
The larger this share, the larger the profit externality. At the sample median of 65% national
markets, the effect on profits in rival markets is .91 percentage points, while a merger that
affects only national markets increases rival profitability by 1.4 percentage points. This is con-
sistent with the view that substitution possibilities are limited in national markets particularly
when a merger further reduces choice.
Column (6) analyzes the effects of the number of competitors remaining after the merger.
We estimate that an additional competitor reduces the profit externality on the market of
rivals by .14 percentage points, such that 8 remaining competitors would eliminate the positive
externality altogether.
Finally, column (7) presents the results of a ’horse race’ of effects of the variables. ’Highest
share’, ’Initial profits’ and ’National markets’ remain positive and significant, while ’Target
share’ and ’Competitor count’ lose significance. This suggests that the variables concerning
merger and market characteristics measure different relevant aspects of the competitive envi-
ronment a merger takes place in.
Summarizing, ’extreme’ mergers, i.e. mergers leading to very large market shares in some
product markets, mergers in markets with a low elasticity of demand, and mergers that pri-
marily affect national markets lead to a large positive profit externality on rival markets.
Moreover, there is evidence that the ’treatment intensity’ due to the merger, i.e. the market
share of the target, as well as the number of (remaining) competitors are crucial in under-
standing the competitive effects of mergers. Thus, we can disentangle the estimated average
treatment effect with variables measuring the most important aspects of the competitive envi-
ronment the merger takes place.
We did not yet analyze another important dimension, namely the time dynamics of merger
16Of course, we would expect that these mergers are only cleared with (structural) remedies, so that this never
happens. The fact, however, that we measure such large externalities indicates that these remedies have not been
completely effective in maintaining effective competition.
17
effects. One could argue that market power effects should materialize fairly soon after the con-
summation of the merger, since only price coordination between acquirer and target needs to
be achieved. Efficiency effects, on the other hand, may take time: firm productive assets need
to be integrated in a sometimes turbulent post merger phase to achieve e.g. economies of
scale or scope; it must be decided which departments should work together, who will be
the (surviving) managers, which operations to close down etc. Sometimes projected efficiency
gains (’synergies’) never materialize, not only in such well known disastrous mergers as Daim-
ler/Chrysler or AOL/Time Warner. Table 5 therefore looks at the time profile of externality
effects on rival markets by interacting our variables of interest with yearly time dummies until
five years after the mergers. We first look at the ATT over time (equation 2) in column 1 and
then add interactions with the variables describing the competitive environment (equation 3).
Column (1) finds that treatment effects are sizeable already in the first two years after
the merger (at .56 and .65 respectively), however insignificantly so. They keep rising to .97
five years after the merger and are significant in periods 3 and 5. Looking at the co-variates
measuring competitive intensity, the evidence that merger effects materialize already in the
first years after the mergers is more clearcut. When disentangling the average effect using
the competition variables highest share, initial profits, and national markets in columns (3) to
(5), all effects are already sizeable and significant in the first year after the consummation of
the mergers. For the other two variables target share and competitor count (columns (2) and
(6)), effects are also as expected, but insignficantly so. This is again indicative that we actually
measure a preponderance of market power effects over efficiency effects for large horizontal
mergers.17
4.1 Robustness Checks
In tables 6 to 10 we perform a number of robustness tests of our main results. We refine the
matching procedure by matching control markets not only on the pre-merger profitability cri-
terion but also on other covariates, we control for rivals involved in mergers in the evaluation
period, we shorten the estimation window to three years after the mergers, and finally we
relax the industry and the geographic constraint imposed in the matching procedure.
4.1.1 Controlling for additional market characteristics
Table 6 matches control markets not only based on market profitability, but also on the dis-
persion of profits, the HHI, and the average Tobins q of control markets. This should allow an
even better mimicking of the level and the dynamics of profits in the treatment market before
17Another indication of market power effects is that, in unreported results, we find that rivals‘ sales growth
exceeds that of the merging firms in the post-merger periods. Thus, their market shares are likely to rise (compare
Gugler and Siebert (2007)).
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Table 5: Treatment effects over time
ATT Target Highest Initial National Competitor
share share profits markets count
Treated 0.069 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.069
(0.224) (0.223) (0.222) (0.219) (0.222) (0.223)
t+1 -0.311 -0.354 -0.389 -0.302 -0.309 -0.329
(0.315) (0.291) (0.301) (0.277) (0.293) (0.292)
t+2 -0.319 -0.254 -0.333 -0.369 -0.343 -0.440
(0.316) (0.291) (0.302) (0.277) (0.293) (0.293)
t+3 -0.211 -0.122 -0.131 -0.241 -0.155 -0.165
(0.323) (0.297) (0.308) (0.282) (0.299) (0.299)
t+4 0.012 -0.199 -0.069 0.011 -0.047 0.007
(0.341) (0.311) (0.325) (0.294) (0.313) (0.313)
t+5 -0.229 -0.139 -0.114 -0.125 -0.196 -0.097
(0.362) (0.328) (0.344) (0.310) (0.330) (0.332)
Treated * Post 0.602∗ -0.325 0.295 -0.116 1.091∗∗∗
(0.341) (0.428) (0.309) (0.351) (0.347)
Treated*(t+1) 0.560 0.015 0.018∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 1.122∗∗ -0.182
(0.446) (0.016) (0.007) (0.039) (0.506) (0.120)
Treated*(t+2) 0.647 0.013 0.018∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 1.437∗∗∗ -0.045
(0.447) (0.017) (0.007) (0.039) (0.506) (0.121)
Treated*(t+3) 0.808∗ 0.021 0.018∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 1.398∗∗∗ -0.121
(0.457) (0.017) (0.007) (0.040) (0.517) (0.122)
Treated*(t+4) 0.621 0.040∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 1.460∗∗∗ -0.170
(0.482) (0.018) (0.007) (0.043) (0.551) (0.128)
Treated*(t+5) 0.965∗ 0.019 0.019∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 1.737∗∗∗ -0.172
(0.512) (0.019) (0.008) (0.051) (0.589) (0.134)
Observations 2712 2612 2644 2555 2692 2692
R2 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01. Column (1) reports the ATTs over time;
columns (2)-(6) interact the time-specific ATTs with the target share, highest share, initial profits, national markets
and competitor count variables respectively.
19
the mergers. Indeed, although losing some 15 percent of the sample due to the increased data
requirements, we obtain more significant results. The main conclusions remain unaltered.
Table 6: Matching on additional market characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treated 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.064 0.061 0.061
(0.229) (0.228) (0.228) (0.224) (0.227) (0.228) (0.223)
Post -0.444∗∗ -0.442∗∗ -0.443∗∗ -0.443∗∗ -0.435∗∗ -0.443∗∗ -0.442∗∗
(0.209) (0.208) (0.208) (0.204) (0.208) (0.208) (0.203)
Treated * Post 0.999∗∗∗ 0.852∗∗ -0.108 0.318 0.184 1.603∗∗∗ -0.552
(0.296) (0.350) (0.438) (0.314) (0.361) (0.355) (0.611)
Target share 0.023∗∗ -0.005
(0.010) (0.012)
Highest share 0.020∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗
(0.005) (0.007)
Initial Profits 0.168∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.023)
National markets 1.388∗∗∗ 0.666∗
(0.329) (0.386)
Competitor count -0.220∗∗∗ 0.013
(0.076) (0.098)
Constant 3.837∗∗∗ 3.835∗∗∗ 3.835∗∗∗ 3.835∗∗∗ 3.828∗∗∗ 3.836∗∗∗ 3.835∗∗∗
(0.162) (0.161) (0.161) (0.158) (0.161) (0.161) (0.157)
Observations 2378 2303 2325 2280 2358 2358 2217
R2 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.05
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
4.1.2 Controlling for rivals involved in mergers
Table 7 tackles a potentially very important problem, namely confounding events in the eval-
uation period. The most obvious confounding event in merger analysis is that merging firms
engage in sequential mergers, i.e. merging in year t and again in t+1 and/or t+2, etc. Thus,
it would not be appropriate to attribute the whole merger effect, say in year t+3, to the first
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merger but it may be that the subsequent mergers also account for parts of the effect. Our
situation is insofar different in that we analyze the effect of a merger on rival markets, nev-
ertheless it may be that mergers systematically subsequently trigger mergers of rivals. To
account for this possibility, table 7 drops a rival from the sample, if this rival was involved in
a merger subsequently to the analyzed merger, in that and all following years.
Specifically, we match the rival firms in the sample to the SDC Platinum database and
check for rival merger activity in the evaluation period. If, for example, we find that a rival
was itself involved in a merger in t+ 3, we include that rival in the estimation sample in t+ 1
and t+ 2, but drop it from t+ 3 onwards.
In so doing, we lose around 20 percent of the sample. While the ATT remains positive
it loses significance. However, the main results with respect to the covariates measuring the
competitive environment remain valid.
4.1.3 Shortening the estimation window
An additional and related concern may be that the fairly long evaluation period of 5 years may
exacerbate the danger that other events than the original merger determines the profitability
of rival markets. In the above robustness check we controlled for rivals being themselves
involved in a merger and excluded those rivals subsequently. However, there may be many
additional unobserved and unobservable events we cannot control for. Therefore, table 8 -
in addition to excluding rivals that are involved in mergers themselves - shortens the post-
treatment window to t+ 1 to t+ 3. This reduces the size of the sample by another 20 percent.
While target share loses significance, all main results hold up.
4.1.4 Relaxing the industry constraint
In the main results, we require the synthetic control groups to be constructed from firms active
in the same 4-digit NACE industry that is concerned by the merger. This seems reasonable
insofar, as firms in the same industry will typically face similar demand conditions and expe-
rience similar shocks and therefore provide a good counterfactual. While we are very careful
to select control firms that are outside the focal mergers’ geographic scope, this could still be
a source of bias. We therefore conduct a robustness test, in which the synthetic control groups
are constructed from industries other than that of the merger. Since this considerably relaxes
the data constraints of the matching procedure, it also permits us to expand the estimation
sample by more than a quarter.18
The results are not strongly affected by this (table 9). All findings from the main spec-
ification remain qualitatively unchanged and significant. Quantitatively, the ATT coefficient
remains virtually identical. Some of the interaction coefficients (target share, highest share,
18Keeping the sample constant, i.e. only relaxing the industry constraint without allowing additional mergers
in the sample, yields virtually identical results. We therefore present the results in the larger sample.
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Table 7: Controlling for rivals involved in mergers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treated -0.011 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.016 -0.019 -0.016
(0.255) (0.252) (0.252) (0.248) (0.254) (0.253) (0.247)
Post -0.359 -0.355 -0.355 -0.355 -0.356 -0.354 -0.356
(0.236) (0.234) (0.234) (0.229) (0.235) (0.234) (0.228)
Treated * Post 0.501 0.158 -0.698 -0.041 -0.104 1.261∗∗∗ -0.994
(0.334) (0.396) (0.496) (0.352) (0.400) (0.405) (0.719)
Target share 0.031∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.012) (0.014)
Highest share 0.020∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008)
Initial Profits 0.180∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.027)
National markets 1.010∗∗∗ -0.157
(0.367) (0.459)
Competitor count -0.275∗∗∗ -0.067
(0.086) (0.121)
Constant 3.866∗∗∗ 3.862∗∗∗ 3.862∗∗∗ 3.862∗∗∗ 3.864∗∗∗ 3.860∗∗∗ 3.861∗∗∗
(0.180) (0.178) (0.179) (0.175) (0.180) (0.179) (0.175)
Observations 2154 2086 2113 2032 2146 2146 1979
R2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.04
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
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Table 8: Shortening the estimation window
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treated -0.013 -0.014 -0.015 -0.019 -0.014 -0.017 -0.018
(0.252) (0.250) (0.250) (0.245) (0.252) (0.251) (0.244)
Post -0.398 -0.399 -0.399 -0.401 -0.398 -0.400 -0.402
(0.256) (0.253) (0.254) (0.248) (0.256) (0.255) (0.247)
Treated * Post 0.513 0.442 -0.629 -0.080 0.024 1.084∗∗ -1.069
(0.361) (0.445) (0.570) (0.391) (0.455) (0.457) (0.850)
Target share 0.018 -0.009
(0.014) (0.017)
Highest share 0.020∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.009)
Initial Profits 0.181∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.032)
National markets 0.818∗ -0.172
(0.446) (0.551)
Competitor count -0.198∗ -0.101
(0.104) (0.145)
Constant 3.866∗∗∗ 3.863∗∗∗ 3.865∗∗∗ 3.860∗∗∗ 3.866∗∗∗ 3.862∗∗∗ 3.859∗∗∗
(0.178) (0.177) (0.177) (0.173) (0.178) (0.178) (0.172)
Observations 1746 1701 1719 1663 1740 1740 1627
R2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.04
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
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initial profits and competitor count) change moderately, but these changes are counteracted
by opposite changes in the average effect, treated× post, so the net effect should be modest.
Table 9: Control groups from different industries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treated 0.144 0.139 0.141 0.141 0.144 0.143 0.134
(0.171) (0.168) (0.168) (0.166) (0.170) (0.170) (0.162)
Post -0.374∗∗ -0.369∗∗ -0.371∗∗ -0.370∗∗ -0.374∗∗ -0.373∗∗ -0.364∗∗
(0.156) (0.153) (0.153) (0.151) (0.154) (0.155) (0.147)
Treated * Post 0.687∗∗∗ 0.508∗ -0.784∗∗ 0.238 -0.201 1.418∗∗∗ -1.354∗∗∗
(0.220) (0.260) (0.312) (0.233) (0.265) (0.263) (0.469)
Target share 0.022∗∗∗ -0.016∗
(0.008) (0.009)
Highest share 0.026∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005)
Initial Profits 0.153∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.017)
National markets 1.598∗∗∗ 0.672∗∗
(0.238) (0.299)
Competitor count -0.248∗∗∗ -0.079
(0.056) (0.079)
Constant 3.757∗∗∗ 3.754∗∗∗ 3.755∗∗∗ 3.755∗∗∗ 3.757∗∗∗ 3.756∗∗∗ 3.751∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.119) (0.119) (0.117) (0.120) (0.120) (0.114)
Observations 3446 3281 3361 3258 3411 3411 3132
R2 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.07
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
4.1.5 Relaxing the geographic constraint
In the main specification, we impose rather strict geographic matching criteria to ensure un-
contaminated control groups: we exclude all markets in which the EC identified relevant
competitors from control groups and, if the EC found the geographic market to be EEA-wide,
we exclude all European nations. The results in table 10 show, that allowing for controls from
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within the mergers’ geographic scope does not qualitatively alter the findings.
Table 10: No geographic matching constraints
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treated 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077
(0.218) (0.218) (0.216) (0.213) (0.217) (0.218) (0.212)
Post -0.502∗∗ -0.500∗∗ -0.501∗∗ -0.498∗∗ -0.495∗∗ -0.500∗∗ -0.497∗∗
(0.199) (0.198) (0.197) (0.195) (0.198) (0.199) (0.193)
Treated * Post 0.922∗∗∗ 0.766∗∗ -0.160 0.534∗ 0.065 1.294∗∗∗ -1.206∗∗
(0.282) (0.332) (0.410) (0.302) (0.338) (0.338) (0.597)
Target share 0.022∗∗ -0.005
(0.010) (0.012)
Highest share 0.019∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007)
Initial Profits 0.155∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.023)
National markets 1.484∗∗∗ 0.841∗∗
(0.305) (0.385)
Competitor count -0.133∗ 0.129
(0.072) (0.099)
Constant 3.903∗∗∗ 3.902∗∗∗ 3.903∗∗∗ 3.900∗∗∗ 3.897∗∗∗ 3.902∗∗∗ 3.899∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.154) (0.153) (0.151) (0.153) (0.154) (0.150)
Observations 2820 2710 2752 2653 2800 2800 2575
R2 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.05
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
5 Conclusion
This article attempts to empirically quantify the changes in firm performance brought about
by a change in the structure of an oligopolistic market. The changes in market structure in our
sample were due to horizontal mergers in the sector, i.e. a transition from an n player oligopoly
to an n− 1 player oligopoly. These mergers were large enough to meet the notification criteria
25
of the EC, which identifies the relevant competitors and the geographic extent of the market.
We exploit this information by confining measurement to the identified competitors, which
are directly affected by the merger and using the geographic market definition as a delineation
criterion for the choice of the (synthetic) control group. One crucial contribution of this paper
is to construct uncontaminated control groups by using only controls that are unaffected by
the merger, since they operate outside the relevant market as defined by the EC. Moreover, in
a series of robustness tests, we take care that other confounding events during the evaluation
period, such as a rival being himself involved in a merger, do not drive our main results. Thus
this is the first paper to measure the externalities of mergers on rivals in a cross-section of
industries.
Standard oligopoly models (i.e. Cournot competition or Bertrand competition with dif-
ferentiated goods) predict that mergers mostly benefit the non-merging parties: while the
merging firms reduce their combined output in order to raise the market price, competitors
gain market shares. In the new equilibrium a higher market price prevails, resulting in higher
profits for competitors. We utilize this basic prediction from standard oligopoly theory to
identify the net effect of market power and efficiencies.
Our results are consistent with these predictions: we find that rival markets (non-merging
firms that are active in the same product market) become significantly more profitable relative
to the synthetic control groups after an acquisition in the industry. We not only estimate the
’average treatment effect on the treated’ but undertake an effort to disentangle this effect and
explain it by the most important aspects of the competitive environment the merger takes
place in. In particular, we find that the average effect masks important distributional charac-
teristics. ’Extreme’ mergers, i.e. mergers leading to very large market shares in some product
markets, mergers in markets with a low elasticity of demand, and mergers that primarily affect
national markets lead to a large positive profit externality on rival markets. Moreover, there is
evidence that the ’treatment intensity’ due to the merger, i.e. the market share of the target, as
well as the number of (remaining) competitors are crucial in understanding the competitive
effects of mergers. Thus, we can explain the estimated average treatment effect with variables
measuring the most important aspects of the competitive environment of the merger. More-
over, we find that most of the effects materialize fairly soon after the merger, which is again
indicative of market power effects outweighing efficiency effects in large horizontal mergers.
These findings are important in at least two respects. From the point of view of economic
theory, our evidence suggests that the predictions of standard IO models appear to describe
well the mechanics of real-world oligopoly markets. We find that the competitive environ-
ment (elasticity of demand, number of competitors and the geographic scope of the affected
markets) as well as merger characteristics (market share of the target, (near) monopolization
of specific product markets due to the merger) have the predicted effects. Conversely, from
the point of view of competition policy enforcement, it appears that there is still much room
for improvement. In line with previous research on the issue (e.g. Duso et al. (2013)), our find-
26
ings suggest that merger remedies are not entirely effective in tackling anticompetitive effects.
Competition policy should take a closer look at mergers that lead to the near monopolization
of specific product markets, leaving little room for remaining effective competition.
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